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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8564

FREDE.RICK RAY SIBERT,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Frederick Ray Sibert, was charged with and
[after trial by jury in the Third Judicial District Court
in and for Salt Lake County] convicted of, the crime of
robbery.
Appellant comes now before this Court appealing from
certain rulings of the trial judge relative to the admission
of evidence and from the sentence imposed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the trial, the complaining witness, Lyle Thomas
Butters, testified regarding the facts surrounding the alleged robbery, and was cross-examined by counsel representing the defendant who sought to impeach the witness.
The State then offered as a witness Police Officer John J.
Ferrin, who testified to what the complaining witness had
told him immediately following the alleged robbery. Ferrin
testified from notes which he had taken at the time and
these notes were offered and accepted into evidence. Counsel objected to Ferrin's testimony and to the admission of
his notes.
On the 9th day of June, 1956, the Trial Judge sentenced
the defendant to the indeterminate term as provided by
law. The court denied the defendant probation.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY
OF OFFICER FERRIN.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE NOTES OF
OFFICER FERRIN.
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POINT III
IF THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN THE
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE SUCH ERROR
WAS HARMLESS AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF
APPELLANT.
POINT IV
IT WAS WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY POWERS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE TO REFUSE TO
GRANT THE APPELLANT PROBATION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY
OF OFFICER FERRIN.
Briefly stated, the is:sue raised by appellant on appeal
is whether it was proper for the Trial Judge to permit
Officer Ferrin to testify as to a conversation had with
the witness Butters immediately following the robbery.
Counsel on cross-examination sought to impeach Butters
by showing that his testimony at the trial was inconsistent
with previous testimony given by him at a pre-trial hearing (R. 20-43) . The alleged inconsistent statement related
only to the color and model of the car used in the robbery.
There was some further testimony that Butters had been
shown a police report just previously to the trial.
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4
There should be no question of a violation of the hearsay rule concerning this testimony of officer Ferrin's notes
since they were not offered as. proof of the matter stated
therein but rather to refute the impeachment (R. 47-49).
With respect to evidence of this character the general
rule is that prior statements of a witness, consistent with
his testimony at the trial are not admissible in corroboration of his testimony unless the witness has been impeached
and then only for the purpose of rehabilitating a witness.
State v. Fouts, (1950) 221 P. 2d 841. Beyond this the
courts are not in harmony and in some jurisdictions a number of exceptions apply to allow in prior consistent statements.
It is commonly held that when a witness's testimony
has been discredited by an imputation of bias, prejudice or
other motive to falsify, his consistent statements made at
a time anterior to the date of the inconsistent statement
tended to show that bias or prejudice did not motivate his
testimony. Sweazey v. Valley TTansport, Inc., et al., (1940)
107 P. 2d 567. Prior consistent statements are also admitted in cases where the testimony of the witness is
assailed as a recent fabrication. "It is the general rule in
this state that where the opposition has assailed the testimony of a 'vitness as being of a recent fabrication, an exception to the Hearsay Rule allo"~s the admission of evidence of statements or conduct prior to the claimed fabrication and consistent 'vith the testimony of the witness at
the trial, 'not to prove the fach~ of the case, but as tending
to sho"v that the 'vitness has not been controlled by motives
of interest and that he has not fabricated something for
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the purpose of the case.'" People v. Walsh, (1956) 301
P. 2d 247. See also State v. Niernan, (1939) 8 P. 2d 713.
It is difficult to see where harm would result in admitting a prior consistent statement provided it was made
anterior to the alleged inconsistent statement, and provided
it was made, as in this case, when the facts were fresh
in the witness's mind. Here, through· cross-examination,
there was imputed to the witness Butters prior false statements. He made statements of fact at a pre-trial hearing
of a certain nature and then at the trial after having been
refreshed in memory by reviewing a police report he testified to different facts. Certainly it is only reasonable to
admit statements made by the witness immediately following the robbery for the purpose of refuting the impeachnlent.
In a 1951 Connecticut trial a situation similar to the
present case arose. A witness for the defendant in a personal injury action was impeached on cross-examination on
the basis of a statement made by the witness to the plaintiff five years after the accident. Over objection, statements made by defendant's witness to other witnesses
shortly after the accident were admitted for purpose of
rehabilitation. In affirming the trial court the Supreme
Court adopted the following reasoning:
"The defendant might well claim that the apparent inconsistency between the recent statement and the witness'
testimony could be accounted for by lapse of memory and
that his memory had been refreshed before he testified.
That he had made a statement shortly after the event when
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his memory was fresh which was in accord with his testimony, clearly was evidence which would tend to prove that
the apparent inconsistency of his later statement was due
to the fact that at the time he made it his memory had
failed and had not been refreshed. With that explanation
his testimony and his later statement could be reconciled
and the apparent inconsistency be explained away." Thomas
v. Ganezer, (1951) 78 A. 2d 539.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE THE NOTES OF
OFFICER FERRIN.
During the course of direct examination of the witness
Ferrin, certain penciled notes describing a conversation
with the complaining witness Butters, over objection of
counsel, were admitted into evidence and shown to the jury.
The notes were written on five pages of small pad paper and
were extremely brief.
Wigmore has outlined a general principle applying to
situations of this nature. "If by verifying and adopting the
record of past recollection the witness makes it usable testimonially, and if by this verification alone can it become
so usable, it follows that record thus adopted becomes to
that extent the embodiment of the witness's testimony.
Thus, (a) the record, verified and adopted, becomes a
present evidentiary statement of the witness; (b) and as
such it may be handed or sho"~n to the jury by the party
offering it." Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, Vol. III,
Sec. 754, p. 97.
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In a personal injury action in Maryland, a similar evidence issue arose. A police officer's report was admitted
a.r1u.ed
. .
into evidence. It was .agnedthat the a d m1ss1on
of sueh
report was error in that it violated the Hearsay Rule. The
Court of Appeals of Maryland said:
"There is no point to this exception, however,
in view of the fact that the oral testimony of the
witness, which, significantly, was offered on behalf
of the defense, simply confirmed the statements in
his written report. There was. admittedly, no variance in any essential particular between this written and oral testimony, so that his oath became, in
effect, the primary substantive evidence, relied upon.
The witness's adoption of his written report made
it his present assertion. . . . The ruling on this
exception was, therefore, neither erroneous nor
prejudicial." Cogswell, et al. v. Frazier, (1944) 39
A. 2d 815.
For a similar conclusion see Ettelson v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company, 164 F. 2d 660.
POINT III
IF THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN THE
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE SUCH ERROR
WAS HARMLESS AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS OF
APPELLANT.
A review of the trial record and particularly of the
testimony of Butters and Ferrin reveals that the portions
of Ferrin's testimony objected to, and his. notes, added
nothing of substance to what Butters had already testified.
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The latter positively identified the defendant, both on the
stand and at a previous line-up, and he described the automobile used in the robbery. There was no disputive evidence as to identity and the only points where inconsistency
appeared were as to the color and model of the car, and these
conflicts were certainly slight.
It is a basic principle of appellate review that a cause
will not be reversed for error unless it affects the substantive rights of the party. The commission of error will not
be presumed to have resulted in prejudice. Section 77-42-1,
Utah Code Annotated 1953.
As late as 1953 the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
said : "'Ve will not reverse criminal causes for mere error
or irregularity. It is only when there has been error which
is both substantial and prejudicial to the rights of the accused that a reversal is warranted." State v. Neal, (1953)
262 P. 2d 756. A similar ruling was stated in State v. Just~en, 35 Utah 105, 99 P. 456.
It has been held that a party complaining of error in
the admission of evidence has the burden of showing prejudice from that error. Hunt v. lVooten, et al., (1953) 76 S.
E. 2d 326. There has been no showing here that the admission of the evidence in question 'Yas of such a nature as to
result in prejudice to the defendant.
In a federal case "chere the issue was similar to the
case before this court it was concluded:
"We think that the question of the admission or
rejection of evidence of prior consistent statements
to sustain the credibility of a witness who has been
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impeached by evidence of prior inconsistent statements is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court, and that its ruling should not result in a
reversal on appeal except where there has been a
prejudicial abuse of discretion" Affronti v. United
States, (1944) 145 F. 2d 3.
The admission of the disputed evidence, if error, did
not prejudice the substantive rights of the appellant. The
Utah Supreme Court held that the erroneous admission of
evidence does not call for reversal of judgment, where the
guilt of the accused is otherwise satisfactorily proved.
State v. Cox, 74 Utah 149, 152, 276 P. 166.

POINT IV
IT WAS WITHIN THE DISCRETIONARY POWERS 0~., THE TRIAL JUDGE TO REFUSE TO
GRANT THE APPELLANT PROBATION.
The primary consideration involved here is the meaning to be drawn from the applicable statute. The last clause
of Section 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, reads :
". . . and may place the defendant on probation for
such period of time as. the Court shall determine.'' The
intent of such wording is clearly to vest in the trial court
discretion in the matter of probation.
In the case of Dimm.ick v. Harris, the Utah Supreme
Court stated as a general rule that: "Whether one convicted
of crime and subject to punishment therefore, should be
placed on probation is. a matter in such Court's discretion",
107 Utah 471, 155 P. 2d 170, Page 172.
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(It should be noted that prior to 1943, the first sentence of what is now Section 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, began: "Upon a conviction." At that date the
phrase, "a plea of guilty or," was inserted between the
words "upon" and "conviction." The reason for the amendment is not known.)
It is important to look to the wording adopted by the
court in passing sentence.
"Now, I can't grant you probation for several reasons,
one of which, of course, is that you deny your guilt in this
matter," (R. P. 121) (italics supplied).
Further on the court said "In addition to that your
record is not favorable and your attitude is not favorable
to obtain probation and for that reason you are committed
forthwith."
Thus the court mentions three reasons why the defendant was denied probation, i. e., an unfavorable record, an
unfavorable attitude and a denial of guilt. After having
presided over the trial and having become somewhat acquainted with the defendant, the court, acting within its
discretionary power, felt that for several reasons it would
not be con1patible with the public interest to grant the
defendant probation. This action was entirely within the
Court's powers.
Appellant's contention seems to be that the effect of
the Court's reasoning is to force the defendant to either
te·stify against himself, or have probation denied him. But
this assumes that the Court's only basis for denying proba-
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tion was the plea of not guilty. This was not the situation
here, the Court mentioned two other reasons.
In 1944 in a decision dealing with the interpretation
of Section 77-35-17, Utah Code Annotated 1953, then Section 105-36-17, the following was stated:
"It is apparent that 105-36-17 supra, gives the
court much greater latitude and power in suspending imposition of sentence than was previously had.
. . . Since the enactment of the statute this Court
has held that 'trial courts are not given authority
to suspend sentences as a matter of favor or grace,
but only when it appears compatible with public
interest.' . . . From the construction of the
statute it is evident that the legislature intended
trial courts should have considerable authority to
reform wrongdoers. . . . The right to suspend
imposition of sentence and the right to place one on
probation is a discretionary right."
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the
trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
VERNON B. ROMNEY,
Assistant Attorney General,
GARY L. THEURER,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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